“The Chamberlain Effect”: When did World War Two really begin?
August 29th, 2009 by admin
The 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War Two this week will passalmost unnoticed in the Czech Republic. The reason is simple. For Czechsand Slovaks the tragedy did not begin with the invasion of Poland, but afull year earlier. With the Munich Agreement of September 1938, Britain,France and Italy gave Hitler the green light to annex huge tracts ofCzechoslovakia and less than six months later, Nazi troops marched intowhat was left of the Czech lands unopposed. So how did Hitler get away withbringing a determined and well-defended democratic country under the swayof the swastika, while Czechoslovakia’s allies stood by? The Britishhistorian and politician, David Faber, has tried to answer this question inhis book, Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis, which focuses above all onthe role of the British political establishment, in particular PrimeMinister Neville Chamberlain. This is the most detailed account of theevents leading up to Munich to be published for several decades, and anAmerican edition is due out this month. I caught up with David Faber inLondon, and we discussed some of the many aspects of a book that deservesto become a classic. “I started off looking at the secondary sources, and we’re fortunate inthat we have many sets of memoirs of many of the key protagonists of thetime from the various different countries. So, we have an absolute wealthof material. Many of the key protagonists kept diaries, wrote their ownmemoirs subsequently, and it was really a bit like a jigsaw, piecingtogether all the individual quotes and the individual moments and timeswhen things were happening. Very often I found that having looked at anevent that had happened in London and an event that had happened in Pragueor in Berlin, or even in Rome, and that these two things had happened atroughly the same time. So I was able to put people’s speech side by side,as to what they’d been thinking in the different capitals of Europe atthe time.”The view of the Munich Crisis from the perspective of the Czech Republicis very much that Britain let down Czechoslovakia, almost as if it were aforegone conclusion. From your book I think you get a rather more nuancedpicture of what was going on politically, that it maybe even needn’t havehappened that way. “The ultimate result was that Czechoslovakia was let down. And I thinkin the end, both in the immediate aftermath of Munich and of course inMarch the following year in 1939, there was no doubt that Czechoslovakiahad been let down by Britain - and also by France of course, in many ways acloser ally of hers at the time. But I agree with you that none of thepoliticians really set out to do that. This wasn’t a deliberate policy. Ithink Chamberlain’s weaknesses were that he was a very arrogant and avery vain man, and I think that once he had set himself on a particularcourse, he decided that he was right and he really wouldn’t brook anyconfrontation with anyone close to him. And his vanity led him to believe,especially after his meetings with Hitler, that he was in some way gettingthe better of Hitler, whereas, in fact, the exact opposite was the case.” David FaberAnd it seems amazing, when you read contemporary sources, that many peoplein Europe, including in Germany itself, really did think that Chamberlainhad got the better of Hitler, didn’t they?“They did, and of course in the immediate aftermath of the MunichCrisis, albeit only for a few days or weeks, Chamberlain was perceived as agreat hero in London, as indeed Daladier the French prime minister was inParis. They were perceived as having pulled of a great coup, albeit at theexpense of the hapless Czechs. But that didn’t last very long. “I think that there was a twofold sense that things had not gone right.First was that I think the British people woke up to the fact that thiswas, from a purely selfish point of view, unlikely to postpone war forever. Of course, one of the most important things to recognize is that,however much he may have been lauded later for postponing war and enablingthe Allies to be better prepared for the Second World War, that was not theintention of Chamberlain and the people immediately around him. Hisintention, as he proudly boasted when he came back from Munich, was toachieve peace for all time, and he firmly believed that he had achievedpeace. “The second thing was that the British people in particular, and I thinkthe French also, did recognize and I think felt a strong sense of guilt onbehalf of the Czechs, and there was a great outpouring of support forCzechoslovakia in the months after the Munich crisis. There was a veryfamous story that the Lord Mayor of London set up a fund to help to sendmoney to Czechoslovakia and to help many of the refugees who’d had toflee the Sudeten areas. Chamberlain was alleged to have told him that hedidn’t want this fund to happen - that it would offend the Germans insome way. It’s a really extraordinary thing to look back on now inhindsight. So there was a great outpouring of relief that war had beenaverted, but I think guilt and shame that the Czechs were being forced togo through what they did.” Adolf Hitler signing the Munich AgreementI’m very interested in the fact that you have written this book as aperson who has his own political background. You were a member of theBritish parliament for the Conservative Party. In your own family there isalso a link with this episode, in that your grandfather was the laterBritish Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. In what ways have your familyexperiences and also your experiences as an active politician influencedthe ways that you have perceived the episode? It must have given you someinsights into the way that politics works, for example. “It did very much. Taking the family connection first - yes, I wasobviously very proud of my grandfather and was very relieved - although Ialready knew it when I started writing the book - to discover that he hadbeen on the right side of the argument as I perceived it, that he had beena great anti-appeaser in the late 1930s. And obviously, having read hisautobiographies and many of his papers, I knew what his views had been atthe time. As far as my own political experience goes, I found thatabsolutely invaluable in writing the book. Anyone who knows about aspecific world and knows how it operates, whatever it happens to be,obviously has a slight insight. And so I was particularly fascinated by theins and outs, the political comings and goings, I could picture thegeography of where the meetings took place, where the debates were beingheld, of where some of the cabinet meetings were being held. So I was ableto - if not picture the people - to picture the scene around them andknow what they were going through. Neville Chamberlain with Adolf Hitler (right)”I think there was something that was also very important and a verystrong connection to my own, much briefer political career. When I firstgot into the British House of Commons in 1992, it was at the height of thedebate within the Conservative Party over the degree to which the BritishConservative Party and the British Government should be at the heart ofEurope. This was an iconic issue within the Conservative Party, and thepressure to conform at the time and the pressure to toe the party line anddo as one was told by the senior politicians in your own party wasenormous. I could absolutely sense, when I was researching the Munichcrisis, this same feeling of pressure and almost of bullying pressure beingapplied from the senior government - from the prime minister down - ontothe junior politicians, the backbenchers, as they’re called in theBritish parliament.” I’m interested that you mention the question of European integration. Iwould have thought that one of the messages of Munich would be thatdemocratic countries should try as much as possible to integrate with oneanother both economically and politically, as this increases the pressureon undemocratic forces not to undermine the democratic nations that aregrouped together. “Well of course you’re quite right to say that and I agree absolutelywith that. You mentioned my grandfather, and I come from a very strongpro-European tradition. I studied modern languages at university. I’vebeen fortunate enough to travel widely in Europe and I come from apolitical tradition within the Conservative Party - which there still is,thankfully - of much closer union and strong ties with the rest ofEurope. But as we know, throughout generations and throughout differentperiods of history, nothing is ever as simple as it seems. Certainly, inthe early 1990s, when I took my own first steps in politics - and therestill is today, I hasten to add - there was a very strong body of opinionwithin the Conservative Party and within some of the other parties as well,which opposed greater European integration. As we speak today, the currentleader of the Conservative Party has moved away from the mainstream in theEuropean Parliament to sit with other people. In many ways, you could saythat there are items of history that repeat themselves almost relentlesslythrough the years. But you could say that people never learn the lessons ofthe past in that respect.” Signing of the Munich Agreement. Left to right: Neville Chamberlain, ?‰douard Daladier, Adolf Hitler and Benito MussoliniOne of the very interesting issues in connection with the Munich debate isthat there is no consensus internationally and there is certainly noconsensus in Britain about Neville Chamberlain’s decision to appeaseHitler. To this day there is quite a strong body of thought, and there havebeen books written about it, arguing that Chamberlain was doing the rightthing, that he was gaining time, that appeasing Hitler in 1938 made Britainstronger in the run up to the Second World War. In a sense, in writingabout Neville Chamberlain’s role in a very negative way, you could beaccused by people in your own party of fouling your own nest. He was aConservative politician and there are still many Conservatives who wouldsympathise with his decision then.“Funnily enough, I’m not sure that the issue of support forChamberlain necessarily divides along party lines. I think that theConservatives as a party are not particularly enamoured of NevilleChamberlain when they look back. He gets a very bad press by and large fromconservative (with a small “c”) writers and observers. But you’requite right that his reputation has suffered ups and downs over the past 60or 70 years. In immediate aftermath of the Second World War he was reallyvilified in Britain. Then in the 1970s a lot of the government papersrelating to this period were released and a number of historians at thetime took the opportunity to write pro-Chamberlain works along the linesthat he was actually quite perspicacious in looking ahead and in appeasingHitler, and that he did buy us time. For instance, the first Spitfires thatfought in the Battle of Britain only rolled out of the factories just intime for the Battle of Britain in 1940, and, had we had to go to war in1938 over Czechoslovakia, we would have been ill-prepared. I think thatnowadays there are fewer historians who are prepared to take that line. Franklin D. Roosevelt”I have taken a line in my book that Chamberlain was at fault, but Ihave based that not so much on his political decisions. What I found verydifficult to sympathise with, reading his letters and in particular his owncontemporary narrative of the period, was that he did believe really muchtoo firmly in his own ability and in his own political credibility. He usedto use this expression called “the Chamberlain effect”. He reallybelieved that he had some kind of momentous effect on everyone he met,including Hitler, and he was badly mistaken in that. He ran anextraordinarily undemocratic government, and indeed the decisions at thetime of the Munich crisis were taken by a very small group of people, allof whom had signed up to and were utterly committed to his own politicalline.”Your book, “Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis”, was published lastyear, in 2008, and it’s just come out, I believe, in paperback as well. “It has, and I’m happy to say that it seems to be doing very well. Andit’s coming out in America in September 2009, which is very exciting. Ithink it’s a period of history that the Americans seem to be fascinatedby. There was American involvement at the time of Munich. Roosevelt wasclosely in touch with what was going on, although he was not really in aposition to alter events in the end, but there’s no doubt in America thatthe word “Munich” is a dirty word. It is undoubtedly a word whichimplies appeasing dictators, and successive American presidents since theSecond World War have often used that to justify their foreign policy.”